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1976] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
signal an end to its use as "'a trap to catch the unwary or the
ignorant.' "129
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEw YORK PRACTICE
Patent danger rule in negligent design actions abandoned.
The patent danger rule, propounded more than 25 years ago in
Campo v. Schofield, °3 0 has prevented many a potential plaintiff
from maintaining an action against a manufacturer for injuries sus-
tained in the use of a negligently designed product. Under the
Campo doctrine, a manufacturer had no duty to warn or protect a
user from conspicuous defects in the design or operation of the prod-
uct.'3' Consequently, the injured user had no right of redress in
negligence against a manufacturer who sold a "patently" dangerous
product, even if minimal safety features were completely lacking. 32
In accord with the current trend towards imposing greater potential
liability on those who place dangerous or defective products into the
stream of commerce, 33 the Court of Appeals, in Micallef v. Miehle
Co.,' 34 has overruled Campo and held that a manufacturer must
exercise that degree of care in the design of his product which is
necessary to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm to anyone ex-
posed to dangers created by any intended or foreseeable use of the
product. 35
ground that it was made after commencement of an action against the public corporation."
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e(5) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
in 38 N.Y.2d at 668, 345 N.E.2d at 564, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 21, quoting Sweeney v. City of
New York, 225 N.Y. 271, 273, 122 N.E. 243, 244 (1919).
1' 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
231 In Campo, the Court held that a manufacturer "is under no duty to guard against
injury from a patent peril or from a source manifestly dangerous." Id. at 472, 95 N.E.2d at
804.
12 See, e.g., Sarnoffv. Charles Schad, Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 180, 239 N.E.2d 194, 292 N.Y.S.2d
93 (1968) (supplier not liable for injury caused by obviously defective scaffolding); Inman v.
Binghamton Hous. Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957) (builder
not liable for child's fall from porch with no guard rail); Edgar v. Nachman, 37 App. Div. 2d
86, 323 N.Y.S.2d 53 (3d Dep't), motion for leave to appeal denied, 29 N.Y.2d 483, 274 N.E.2d
312, 324 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1971) (allegations of improperly designed gas tank and cap insuffi-
cient to state claim); Tatik v. Miehle-Goss-Dexter, Inc., 28 App. Div. 2d 1111, 284 N.Y.S.2d
597 (1st Dep't 1967) (mem.), aff'd mem., 23 N.Y.2d 828, 245 N.E.2d 231, 297 N.Y.S.2d 586
(1969) (absence of automatic shutoff device on offset press not evidence of defective design).
I" See, e.g., Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373
N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975), discussed in The Survey, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 179, 181 (1975).
134 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976), rev'g 46 App. Div. 2d 790,
361 N.Y.S.2d 25 (2d Dep't 1974) (mem.). For another discussion of Micallef, see 1 L. FRUMER
& M. FREIDMAN, PRODUcrs LABnILTY § 7.02 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FRUMER & FRIEDMAN.
in 39 N.Y.2d at 385, 348 N.E.2d at 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 121.
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The Micallef plaintiff, an offset printing press operator, was
injured while attempting to remove a foreign object from the print-
ing plate. Due to the absence of safety guards near the press rollers,
a clear and obvious danger, 136 plaintiff's hand was drawn into the
machine and injured. Plaintiff brought an action against the manu-
facturer of the press, alleging both negligent design and breach of
an implied warranty of merchantability, but was unsuccessful on
the negligence claim in both the supreme court and on appeal to the
appellate division. 7
Addressing the negligent design claim, Judge Cooke, writing for
a unanimous Court of Appeals, observed that the Court's past reluc-
tance to extend the manufacturer's duty to guard against injuries
arising from patent defects in the design of its products was due to
the belief that a manufacturer was under no duty to make an
accident-proof product. 138 According to the Micallef Court, Campo
and its progeny adhered to the belief that only legislative action was
appropriate to force manufacturers to install safety devices and
eliminate patently defective designs. 36 While this deference to the
legislature may have been commendable, its effect often was to
foreclose judicial relief to parties injured in accidents where there
were "open and obvious" risks involved in the use of a piece of
machinery.4 0 Although agreeing that the manufacturer is not under
' See id. at 379-80, 348 N.E.2d at 573-74, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
' ' The jury had returned a verdict in favor of defendant on the negligence cause of action
and a verdict in plaintiff's favor on the implied warranty action. Both verdicts apparently
were due in part to an erroneous charge to the jury. Id. at 381, 348 N.E.2d at 573, 384 N.Y.S.2d
at 118. While the trial judge felt that these errors justified a new trial, the appellate division
did not agree, and reinstated the verdict in favor of defendant on the negligence cause and
directed judgment for defendant on the warranty claim. 46 App. Div. 2d at 791, 361 N.Y.S.2d
at 27. After examining the record, the Court of Appeals found that the original order of a new
trial was justified. 39 N.Y.2d at 382, 348 N.E.2d at 575, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 118-19.
11 39 N.Y.2d at 383, 348 N.E.2d at 576, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 119, discussing Campo v.
Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 472, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1950). See also R. HuesH & H. BAILEY,
AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 2d § 9:4, at 258 (1974). In support of this view, the
Campo Court indicated that where the danger is patent, the user's own conduct rather than
the design of the instrumentality is the proximate cause of the injury. See 301 N.Y. at 473,
95 N.E.2d at 804-05. The Court also noted that where the danger is open and obvious to all,
a manufacturer has the right to expect the user to take all precautions necessary to avoid
injury. Id. at 472, 95 N.E.2d at 804.
" 39 N.Y.2d at 383, 348 N.E.2d at 576, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 119-20.
Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier: A Primer, 2 HoFSTRA
L. REV. 521, 541 (1974). Concern over the judiciary's inability to deal with highly technical
product safety issues has given rise to calls for legislative action. One commentator has
remarked: "At the present time, almost any ill-trained and scientifically ignorant judge is at
liberty to determine the efficacy of a manufacturer's design . . . no matter how complex
. ... Pawlak, Manufacturer's Design Liability: The Expanding Frontiers of the Lau', 19
DEFENSE L.J. 143, 170 (1970).
[Vol. 51:201
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a duty to guard against all risk of accident, the Micallef Court noted
that some expansion of liability was warranted, primarily because
the manufacturer is in the best position to recognize and cure dan-
gerous designs.'
In altering the degree of care owed by the manufacturer, the
Court carefully noted that its holding does not require "a manufac-
turer to clothe himself in the garb of an insurer ... '142 Unlike a
strict products liability action, in which no showing of fault is re-
quired, "I a manufacturer in a negligent design action cannot be held
liable if he has exercised reasonable care in the design of his prod-
uct.' A plaintiff must establish all the elements of a negligence
cause of action, including fault.
In reaching its conclusion, the Micallef Court drew upon both
similar decisions in other jurisdictions'45 and scholarly criticism of
the Campo doctrine. 4 ' Noting the inconsistency inherent in the pat-
ent danger rule, Judge Cooke declared that
on the one hand, it places a duty on the manufacturer to develop
a reasonably safe product yet eliminates this duty. . . if the dan-
gerous character of the product can be readily seen, irrespective of
whether the injured user or consumer actually perceived the dan-
ger.147
"1 39 N.Y.2d at 386, 348 N.E.2d at 578, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 121-22.
S24 Id.
"' See, e.g., Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 121-22, 305 N.E.2d
750, 752, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617, 620 (1973).
"1 39 N.Y.2d at 384-85, 348 N.E.2d at 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 121.
"1 Judge Cooke commented favorably on the approach taken in Pike v. Frank G. Hough
Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60
N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972), and Palmer v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 476
P.2d 713 (1970). In all three cases, the patent danger rule was criticized for allowing the
manufacturer of a dangerously designed product to escape liability simply because the defect
satisfies an objective standard of "obviousness." These courts found that permitting manu-
facturers to sell patently dangerous products without fear of liability affords no protection to
a user who, for some reason, fails to perceive the danger.
"I See, e.g., 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 28.5 (1956); FRUMER &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 134, § 7.02; Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make A Right:
Manufacturer's Liability for Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1065 (1973). It
has been suggested that a less restrictive interpretation of Campo was entirely feasible.
Professor Noel, for example, has argued that Campo did no more than make the obviousness
of the defect one of the significant factors to be considered on the question of liability. Noel,
Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816,
837 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Noel].
I" 39 N.Y.2d at 384, 348 N.E.2d at 576, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 120. Obviously, the Court was
fearful that the patent danger rule would encourage negligent product design. Encouraging
manufacturers to make safer products is one of the themes often evinced in cases expanding
the scope of products liability. See, e.g., Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 341, 298 N.E.2d
622, 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 468-69 (1973). As the Micallef Court indicated, this policy is
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Moreover, the Court found the rigidity of the rule inequitable in
that it failed to take into account the difficulties present in discover-
ing "patent" defects in highly technical products whose operation
is often "'far beyond the ken of the average consumer.' "',
In place of the Campo rule, the Court propounded a balancing
approach for determining whether a manufacturer has satisfied his
duty of reasonable care. Under this approach, the trier of fact must
weigh the seriousness and probability of foreseeable harm which a
patently dangerous product might cause against the burden which
would be imposed on the manufacturer were he to take steps to
avoid that danger.'49 The obviousness of the danger is no longer an
absolute bar to maintenance of an action, although it remains a
factor in determining the plaintiff's responsibility for the accident
and in allocating damages.150
frustrated when liability cannot be imposed on a manufacturer who constructs an obviously
dangerous product. 39 N.Y.2d at 384, 348 N.E.2d at 576, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 120.
1" 39 N.Y.2d at 385, 348 N.E.2d at 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 121, quoting Codling v. Paglia,
32 N.Y.2d 330, 340, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 468 (1973). In the past, courts
consistently refused to undertake an inquiry into whether a plaintiff actually perceived the
danger; rather, they applied an objective test to determine whether the danger was patent or
latent. E.g., Meyer v. Gehl. Co., 42 App. Div. 2d 461, 348 N.Y.S.2d 801 (3d Dep't 1973) (not
relevant that "patent" defect might not be recognizable to child-plaintiff); see Inman v.
Binghamton Hous. Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957) (Court did
not discuss fact that at the time of accident the injured child was only two years old).
Moreover, where the product's design was so simple as to be readily observable, courts
frequently found defects to be patent even though they were not apparent upon initial inspec-
tion. See, e.g., Lewis v. John Royle & Sons, 46 App. Div. 2d 304, 362 N.Y.S.2d 262 (3d Dep't
1974); Edgar v. Nachman, 37 App. Div. 2d 86, 323 N.Y.S.2d 53 (3d Dep't), motion for leave
to appeal denied, 29 N.Y.2d 483, 274 N.E.2d 312, 324 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1971); Noel, supra note
146, at 838. But see Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d
644 (1973).
"1 39 N.Y.2d at 386, 348 N.E.2d at 577-78, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 121. Some of the factors to
be considered in resolving the issue include: cost of manufacturing a safer product; industry
custom and practice as to inclusion of a safety device; effect of inclusion of the device on
marketability of the product; whether the manufacturer kept abreast of scientific discoveries
affecting the product; and, whether safety tests of the product had been conducted. Id. Such
an approach has previously been suggested by several commentators. E.g., 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.4 (1956); Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product
Supplier: A Primer, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521 (1974).
"' Prior decisions treated the nature of the defect as bearing upon the existence of the
manufacturer's duty of care. See, e.g., Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 156, 305
N.E.2d 769, 772, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644, 648 (1973); Sarnoff v. Charles Schad, Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 180,
186, 239 N.E.2d 194, 197, 292 N.Y.S.2d 93, 98 (1968). Micallef is a significant departure from
that approach in that now the obviousness of the danger will be considered only in assessing
the plaintiffs conduct and in ascertaining damages, and will not be a factor in determining
the existence of the manufacturer's duty to provide a reasonably safe product. Prior to
enactment of the comparative negligence statute, CPLR art. 14-A, the obviousness of a defect
might have completely barred recovery even absent application of the Campo rule since
plaintiff's use of a patently dangerous machine might be deemed to amount to contributory
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It is submitted that Micallef is consonant with both the legisla-
tive intent underlying enactment of the comparative negligence
statutes 151 and recent developments in the field of products liability
that have expanded the enterprise liability of manufacturers. '5 2 The
Campo rule was inconsistent with the modern tendency to place
liability for injuries caused by defective products on manufacturers
under the theory that they are best able to correct defects and can
allocate the additional cost to the consumers, who will thus benefit
from a safer product.'5 3
The Court's adoption of a balancing test brings the negligent
design area into conformity with traditional tort principles which
provide that one who has exercised reasonable care in choosing or
acting upon a course of conduct cannot be held liable in negligence
to one who is unintentionally injured by such conduct.'54 Basically,
the test adopted by the Micallef Court is also one of reasonableness,
focusing upon whether the design is unreasonably dangerous in light
of the steps which could be taken by the manufacturer to produce
a safer product. 5 By enunciating the factors and circumstances to
be considered on the issue of reasonableness,' the Court has laid
down practical guidelines which ensure that future negligent design
negligence or assumption of the risk. In either a negligence or strict products liability action,
if the plaintiff could have perceived the danger by exercising reasonable care, the defendant
would not be liable, even though the instrumentality was unreasonably dangerous. This
barrier will be much less significant in the future since in causes of action accruing on or after
September 1, 1975 a plaintiff's unreasonable failure to perceive the danger will affect the
amount of damages recoverable, but will not be determinative insofar as the existence of
liability is concerned. See CPLR 1411-13, discussed in The Survey, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 179,
196 (1975); note 157 infra.
The Court of Appeals did not address the issue of whether plaintiff could have been found
contributorily negligent if he was acting under the directions of his employer. There is some
authority to the effect that in such a case, the plaintiff, as a matter of law, cannot be held
contributorily negligent, even in a suit against the manufacturer rather than the employer.
See Boerio v. Haiss Motor Trucking Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 228, 181 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1st Dep't
1959). The significance of Boerio is questionable in light of the adoption of comparative
negligence in New York.
I" See CPLR 1411-13, discussed in The Survey, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 179, 196 (1975);
note 157 infra.
"I2 See Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 662, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973),
discussed in The Survey, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 611, 616 (1974) (strict products liability cause
of action recognized in New York); Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395,
335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975), discussed in The Survey, 50 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 179,
181 (1975) (tort statute of limitations adopted for strict products liability action).
"' See Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 341, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461,
468 (1973).
See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 341, 162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928).
See 39 N.Y.2d at 385-86, 348 N.E.2d at 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 121.
58 See note 149 supra.
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litigation will involve realistic inquiry into the merits of individual
claims, rather than mechanical application of a dogmatic formula-
tion.
Furthermore, the Micallef decision is in conformity with the
view, recently expressed by both the legislative'57 and judicial '"
branches in New York, that rigid, absolute rules of liability which
prevent the assertion of meritorious claims should be replaced with
flexible rules allowing inquiry into the individual merits of each
case. Continued judicial refusal to reexamine a rule that was estab-
lished a quarter-century ago and has since been the subject of much
criticism would have been unjustified, for, as one court stated in a
different context, courts "act in the finest common-law tradition
when [they] adapt and alter decisional law to produce common-
sense justice.' '5 9
Use of term "issue" in a will presumed to encompass illegitimates.
An examination of recent judicial decisions on both the federal
and state levels evinces an increased concern for the rights of illegiti-
mates.'6 The extent to which children born out of wedlock enjoy the
same rights as legitimates is far from settled, however, inasmuch as
conflicting decisions continue to appear.'"' One troublesome ques-
"I See ch. 69, § 1, [1975] N.Y. Laws 95 (McKinney) (codified at CPLR 1411-
13) (comparative negligence statute). It is interesting to note that the legislature's enactment
of this chapter was viewed by some commentators as a legislative overruling of Campo. See
FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 134, § 7.02, wherein the authors note that in recommending
the statute to the legislature, the Judicial Conference specifically stated that under the new
statute the patent danger rule should only be a factor in diminishing damages. The Micallef
Court, however, based its decision on other grounds, since the cause of action accrued prior
to the effective date of the comparative negligence law. See CPLR 1413.
"I See, e.g., Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382
(1972).
Wg oods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 355, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1951) (Desmond, J.).
, See, e.g., New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (illegitimates
have right to receive welfare benefits); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)
(illegitimates have right to receive workmen's compensation death benefits upon death of
father); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimates have standing to sue for wrongful
death of mother); cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (father entitled to hearing on
his fitness to retain custody of his illegitimate child); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins.
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (mother has standing to sue for wrongful death of illegitimate child).
Decisions on the state level have had a similar effect. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 75 Misc. 2d
502, 348 N.Y.S.2d 315 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County 1973) (illegitimates have standing to sue for
wrongful death of father); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Hernandez, 63 Misc. 2d 1058,
314 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970) (illegitimates entitled to proceeds of father's
life insurance policy); cf. Holden v. Alexander, 39 App. Div. 2d 476, 336 N.Y.S.2d 649 (2d
Dep't 1972) (father has standing to sue for wrongful death of illegitimate child).
"' While the Supreme Court has struck down as violative of the equal protection clause
several statutory schemes which distinguished between legitimates and illegitimates, see
[Vol. 51:201
